A solution for Europe's banking problem. Bruegel Policy Brief No. 2009/03, 12 June 2009 by Posen, Adam & Véron, Nicolas.
A SOLUTION FOR EUROPE’S
BANKING PROBLEM
bruegelpolicybrief
ISSUE2009/03
JUNE 2009
by Adam Posen
Deputy Director, Peterson Institute for
International Economics
aposen@piie.com
and Nicolas Véron
Research Fellow at Bruegel
n.veron@bruegel.org
SUMMARYUnprecedented state intervention on both sides of the Atlantic
since October 2008 has prevented outright financial breakdown. But as
long as many of its banks are insolvent or likely to become so, Europe will
suffer continued economic misery, given the predominance of traditional
banking in corporate finance and household savings on the continent. A
lesson from major past crises is that the drag on growth will persist until
the most fragile banks are openly identified and fixed. Such a process
always requires great political will. In Europe, the challenge is compounded
by institutional mismatch, namely the combination of a largely integrated
market with national supervisory structures. Because of cross-border link-
ages, national approaches cannot be expected to deliver the necessary
unbiased results.
POLICY CHALLENGE
Initiative is needed for Europe to avoid a costly drag on growth, as with
Japan’s lost decade. This cannot await an overhaul of supervisory architec-
ture, which will not be effective for several years. The approach needs to be
system-wide, with centralised ‘triage’ of major banks on the European conti-
nent and public restructuring of the
weakest ones. We propose that relevant
countries jointly create a temporary
‘European Bank Treuhand’ to steer the
triage process, catalyse recapitalisations,
and manage any distressed assets that
would fall into public ownership. Fiscal
outlays would remain in national govern-
ments’ hands. This will also buy time for
broader reform of supervisory structures
that would make cross-border banking
sustainable in the EU.
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Figure 1: Banking vs other sources of capital, selected indicators, % GDP
Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009. Figures relate to end 2007.
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Figure 2: Bank writedowns, past and future
* Denmark, Sweden, UK, plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Amounts in US$ billions. Source:
IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009.
1. EUROPE’S BANKING PROBLEM:
SUSTAINED FRAGILITY
Since mid-2007, public authorities
in the European Union have
broadly met the challenge of
ensuring a functional degree of
liquidity and preventing financial
meltdown. The Eurosystem has
even been ahead of the curve
compared to the Federal Reserve
and the Bank of England in
discounting early on a wide
variety of assets to a wide range of
counterparties. However, despite
unprecedented central bank
intervention, extensive govern-
ment guarantees from October
2008, and macroeconomic
assistance (with the International
Monetary Fund) to the EU’s most
fragile member states, the under-
lying state of continental Europe’s
banking industry remains very
fragile
1. 
The health of banks means a lot to
the European economy. The EU is
far more reliant than the United
States on bank credit, as Figure 1
shows, and on bank intermedia-
tion of savings. As of 2007, 34
percent of EU household financial
assets were currency and
deposits (27 percent in the United
Kingdom, 37.5 percent in the euro
area), mostly bank-held,
compared with less than 15
percent in the US
2. Banks also
represent a larger share of the
overall corporate landscape in the
EU. By mid-2007, they repre-
sented no less than 24 percent of
the aggregate market value of
European listed companies among
the world’s 500 largest, compared
to only 16 percent in the US (by 31
March 2009, these proportions
had halved to 12 percent and eight
percent respectively)
3.
As a consequence, healing the
banking system is especially
crucial for sustained recovery in
Europe. Lingering banking fragility
would result in recurrent disrup-
tion or misallocation of bank credit
and would have a sizable negative
impact on economic activity,
depressing investment. Monetary
policy and asset guarantee meas-
ures, which steepen the yield
curve and increase banks’
margins, would play to the detri-
ment of savers, depressing
consumption. Ongoing fragility will
not just depress aggregate
demand through these two chan-
nels, but will harm European trend
productivity growth by skipping
some investment and R&D cycles,
misallocating capital to lower-
return projects, and wasting
human capital by consigning
some workers to long-term unem-
ployment
4. Conversely, there is, at
least in this crisis, no convincing
evidence that continental Europe’s
reliance on banks has delivered
more financial stability than the
more securitised finance of the US
and the UK.
How big is Europe’s banking
problem? There is not enough
transparency to provide an
uncontroversial answer. IMFA SOLUTION FOR EUROPE’S BANKING PROBLEM
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Figure 3: Aggregate market capitalisation of large listed financial firms
Source: FT Global 500 rankings, authors’ calculations. Mid-2007 = 100.
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Figure 4: Market assessment of liquidity and solvency risk
Source: Datastream, European Banking Federation, British Banking Association, series ending 2 June 2009. Methodology based on Jens
Eisenschmidt and Jens Tapking, ‘Liquidity risk premia in unsecured interbank money markets’, ECB Working Paper1025, March 2009.
estimates anticipate big losses in
euro-area headquartered banks,
as shown in Figure 2. A team of
economists at Goldman Sachs
independently came to a similar
figure of €569 billion in as yet
unrecognised losses
5. Even allow-
ing for more optimistic scenarios,
there is no escaping the great
magnitude of the losses to come
for continental Europe’s banks,
illustrated by the slightly steeper
decline in the aggregate market
value of large European listed
banks compared to their US coun-
terparts since the crisis started,
shown in Figure 3. These losses
portend bank insolvencies, since
the projected losses are too large
to be fully compensated for by
future retained earnings,
especially as they are likely to be
very unevenly distributed among
banks. 
Figure 4 compares market indica-
tors of liquidity and solvency risk.
It illustrates the success of liquid-
ity provision since the turmoil
following the Lehman bankruptcy,
but also the persistent perception
of insolvency risk, even after the
remarkable easing since March.
Major European banks cannot be
considered in more robust condi-
tion now than in late 2008, and a
number of them are likely to be
either insolvent or seriously under-
capitalised, though which are thus
afflicted cannot be determined on
the basis of currently available
public information.
The magnitude of the problem,
however, does not guarantee a
prompt policy response. Elected
officials typically find it hard to
find the political will to take tough
measures to deal with banking
difficulties, when forbearance is
an easier short-term option. The
inaction of the US government
during the 1980s Savings and
Loan (S&L) crisis, and the
Japanese government during the
1990s, illustrate this difficulty
6. In
continental Europe, the centrality
of banking and the high number of
people it employs make the
situation more acute. 
Nor are market pressures likely to
prompt proactive policy action.
Current state guarantees remove
pressure from depositors on
weaker institutions. Central banks’
liquidity provision has saved the
macroeconomy, but has also
eroded discipline. The perceived
availability of generousb
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government bailouts, at least for
the first few banks to face prob-
lems, also relieves equity market
pressure. Furthermore, politically
induced moves away from ‘fair-
value’ accounting shift the
scrutiny from individual bank
balance sheets to a far more
damaging general air of uncer-
tainty over the entire financial
system. The resulting challenge
has been insufficiently acknowl-
edged by European policymakers
so far. 
2. THE NEED FOR A EUROPEAN
APPROACH TO TRIAGE AND
RESOLUTION
Systemic banking crises are
especially difficult to address,
because they cast doubt on all
banks simultaneously. Yet policy-
makers prefer that general drag to
having to close specific banks.
Failure to confront the problem,
though, only aggravates the crisis.
A key aim is to allow the
marketplace to differen-
tiate among banks and
to regain trust in those
sound enough to
continue their opera-
tions without major
change, while unsus-
tainable banks are duly
restructured
7.  
This ‘triage’ process
8 necessarily
involves a system-wide assess-
ment of the solidity and long-term
viability of all or most key banks
on a comparative basis using a
consistent methodology. In times
of crisis, accounting information
as appears in the banks’ published
financial statements is of limited
use, because the usual incentives
for issuers to provide high-quality
disclosure are weakened. Triage
cannot be spontaneous and
market-driven, and has to be a
specific process at the initiative of
public authorities to deliver the
required reliability and
comparability. 
None of the major
banking crises of the
last few decades in
developed economies
have been ultimately
overcome without
something akin to a
triage process, and the
later it comes, the greater the
crisis’ economic cost. In the US in
1989, it took the form of an over-
hauled regulatory framework and
a Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) to restructure failed S&L
associations. Sweden in 1993
created a Bank Support Authority
(BSA) to assess banks’ assets and
take over ownership of those
found insolvent
9. In Japan, the
Financial Services Agency in
2002-03 launched
‘special inspections’ of
the major banks, and
harsh measures
imposed on undercapi-
talised banks eventu-
ally led to recovery. By
contrast, approaches
that focused on the
state buying assets deemed ‘toxic’
from banks still in private owner-
ship played a marginal role, if
any
10. The term ‘bad banks’ some-
times used to describe such
approaches can be misleading, as
those ‘bad banks’ set up in Sweden
in 1992-93 involved no transfer of
assets to the state in situations
where there had not been prior full
nationalisation
11.
Triage has not started in continen-
tal Europe. On the basis of general
‘A key aim is to
allow the
marketplace to
differentiate
among banks.’
principles agreed in October 2008
and under the control of the
European Commission’s Direct-
orate-General (DG) for Comp-
etition, member states have
injected capital into many banking
groups. The De Larosière Report to
the European
Commission
(February 2009)
called for consistent
crisis management
but focused on mid-
to long-term institu-
tional responses. In
May 2009, the Committee of
European Banking Supervisors
(CEBS) announced that tests
would be conducted in each EU
member state on the basis of
‘common scenarios and guideli-
nes’
12, but specified that ‘this is
not a stress test to identify individ-
ual banks’ and that ‘the outcomes
[would remain] confidential’,
meaning no effective triage
process. By comparison, the US
stress tests completed in early
May have given markets a means
of improving their understanding
of the respective strengths and
vulnerabilities of major US banks. 
Could triage be done successfully
in Europe on a country-by-country
basis? There are certainly strong
political forces against a suprana-
tional approach. National govern-
ments (and ultimately, taxpayers)
have to pay for the upfront costs of
any recapitalisation. Bank supervi-
sion is also presently primarily
national. Bank shareholders and
management tend to make their
case for bailouts to national politi-
cians, whether as multinationals
claiming to boost the country’s
image, or as local banks purporting
to provide capital on favourable
terms to local communities and
‘There are strong
political forces
against a suprana-
tional approach.’A SOLUTION FOR EUROPE’S BANKING PROBLEM
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Figure 5: Average internationalisation of large banks
Source: Ranking by 2008 assets based on Forbes Global 2000 list, April 2009. Distribution of
2008 revenue based on Worldscope data, company reports, SEC filings, and authors’ assump-
tions. For two banks in the continental European sample the distribution was based on assets,
for lack of disclosure of revenue.
projects. The increasingly fervent
discussion over financial national-
ism of late reflects these incen-
tives. Finally, governments’
antipathy to fiscal federalism
makes collaboration on banking
crisis resolution a reflexively
unappealing prospect, as was
clear when appeals for an ‘EU bank
fund’ were rejected in the dramatic
early days of October 2008
13. 
However, Europe’s current banking
problem must be tackled cross-
nationally for two key reasons,
both linked to the advanced
(albeit far from complete
14) cross-
border integration of Europe’s
financial systems, as Figure 5
illustrates.
First, only centralised balance-
sheet assessment and stress-
testing can effectively restore
trust. Standards must conform not
just in principle to ‘harmonised
parameters’
15, but their implemen-
tation must also be uniform in
practice. Given the incentives,
decentralised implementation is a
recipe for gaming of the system
and ultimately ineffectiveness.
Under the seemingly patriotic
imperative to protect local ‘cham-
pions’, national authorities would
be too lenient on ‘their’ banks in
order to support them in the
competition with peers from
neighbouring countries. A supervi-
sory race to the bottom would
ensue. But a proper triage process
must include a willing-
ness to put an unflat-
tering spotlight on
banks found too weak,
and apply the same
discount to identical
distressed assets irre-
spective of country of
issuer (the same
considerations also
justify DG Competition’s continued
vigilance). 
Second, the high risk of cross-
border bank insolvency requires a
supranational approach to crisis
management, as the addition of
ad-hoc national measures has
been proven inadequate to handle
such situations. This risk was
generally not a major concern in
past financial crises, because the
degree of cross-border banking
integration remained limited. The
systemic banking crises in Spain
(started 1977), the United States
(1988), Finland, Norway and
Sweden (1991), and Japan
(1997) were essentially national
in scope
16. Otherwise, only three
significant multinational banks
have failed since 1970. While the
failure of Herstatt
Bank (1974) led to
the formation of the
Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision
and upgrading of
settlement systems,
those of BCCI (1991)
and Barings (1995)
did not result in signif-
icant international reform, in spite
of serious dysfunction of cross-
border cooperation. But the risk
landscape has now been
profoundly affected by financial
and banking integration
17.
Post-Lehman, normal insolvency
proceedings cannot be envisaged
for systemically important banks.
Thus,  ad-hoc, out-of-court solu-
tions must be devised to manage
failures. As cases such as Fortis or
Hypo Real Estate have illustrated,
this is a challenge irrespective of
the cross-border dimension;
among EU countries, only Italy and
the UK have a special insolvency
regime for banks. For a multina-
tional bank, any home-
government-led resolution would
create a high risk of unfair treat-
ment of non-domestic stakehold-
ers, as when Iceland in 2008
nationalised banks and froze the
accounts of foreign clients, who
were more numerous than its total
population. Similarly, home-
country-led resolution of a
western European bank with large
operations in central and eastern
‘Only centralised
balance-sheet
assessment and
stress-testing can
effectively restore
trust.’A SOLUTION FOR EUROPE’S BANKING PROBLEM
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18For Treuhandanstalt,
a fiduciary entity in
German. The word was
used for the agency
that restructured and
sold the former
Democratic Republic’s
state-owned
businesses from 1990
to 1994. The German
press has also referred
to Finanzmarkt-
stabilisierungsanstalt,
an agency established
in late 2008 in the
context of the banking
crisis, as
‘Bankentreuhand’. 
Europe may create a politically
disruptive discrepancy between
home and host countries. Another
option, the joint management of
the ailing bank by several
countries concerned, is also
impractical. This is what Belgium,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands
attempted with Fortis when it was
considered unviable in late
September 2008, but cooperation
collapsed after a few days due to
incompatible domestic political
pressures. Moreover, any future
cases may be more difficult to
handle than Fortis, which had
quality assets and operated in
countries with long experience of
mutual cooperation.
Also, pooling the management of
distressed assets and bank
shares and securities in public
ownership at European level is the
only way to have true price discov-
ery and sufficiently deep, liquid
markets for such securities, thus
preparing the ground for eventual
exit.
Thus, triage and resolution have to
be centralised at supranational
level. Otherwise it will not work.
Policymakers have so far refused
to acknowledge this reality. This is
not just due to Britain’s sover-
eignism, France’s economic
nationalism, the Czech Republic’s
Euroscepticism, or Germany’s
politicised banking system and
ongoing election campaign. The
difficulty is compounded by deep
institutional mismatch, as none of
the existing supranational
institutions in the EU is well suited
to the task. The European
Commission’s DG Competition has
played a key role in developments
so far, but its mandate is about
competition, not financial
stability. More generally, the
Commission does not currently
have the operational or political
capacity to take over the triage
task; neither does the European
Investment Bank. For the
European Central Bank (ECB),
banking triage would arguably be
incompatible with the independ-
ence needed for its monetary
policy mission and would certainly
be outside its staff’s primary
responsibilities. Existing bank-
specific ‘colleges’ of supervisors
do not provide the required central
authority. CEBS has
very few staff, and its
current governance is
ill-suited to the public
responsibility that
triage would entail
(and the authority
suggested by the De
Larosière Report to replace it will
take a long time to establish).
Existing global entities, including
the Financial Stability Board, are
even less suited to the triage task. 
A new instrument is needed. This is
not unprecedented. European-
level evaluation of private entities
for safety or impact are accepted
in many areas, such as environ-
mental or consumer regulation,
even where there are implications
at national level for expenditure.
The absence of funding at
European level for the require-
ments of judgments made supra-
nationally (beyond the trivial
salaries and operations of the
supervisors) is not a barrier to
making those judgments. If
anything, the case for doing so is
stronger in an integrated financial
market, where the problems of one
nation’s banks can rapidly spill
over into another or all nations’
economies. What may look costly
as an on-budget mandate to
national governments to spend
money is actually much less
costly than allowing the banking
fragility to continue to drag down
and distort all of Europe’s
economies. And there is an addi-
tional risk of damaging market
fragmentation if the current policy
paralysis continues. 
3. HOW TO DO IT: A TEMPORARY
EUROPEAN BANK ‘TREUHAND’
We propose the creation of a
temporary suprana-
tional agency or
Treuhand
18, for a
limited period of, say,
five years. Ideally this
may be established by
all EU countries jointly,
but it is more realistic
to rely only on the endorsement
and support of those member
states where the headquarters of
most banks active in the entire EU
are located. ‘Critical mass’ would
arguably entail the participation of
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, possibly
Spain and Sweden, but not neces-
sarily the UK as large British banks
have only limited presence in
other EU countries. It could be
discussed whether Switzerland
may become an affiliate member. 
Functionally, this structure paral-
lels that of the previously
mentioned US RTC and Swedish
BSA. It is also designed to respect
the subsidiarity principle and
minimise the political obstacles.
Political qualms cannot be permit-
ted to keep Europe in a lost decade
as occurred in Japan. Crucially, the
proposal does not require EU-level
treaty provisions or binding steps
towards fiscal federalism. 
‘Political qualms
cannot be permit-
ted to keep Europe
in a lost decade as
occurred in Japan.’A SOLUTION FOR EUROPE’S BANKING PROBLEM
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The Treuhand would have three
clearly defined tasks. First, it
would evaluate the capital
adequacy of major banks on a
consistent European basis. The
definition of ‘major’, or systemic,
would combine measures of size
and cross-border activity. Not all
European banks need be so scruti-
nised, but conversely, cross-
border effects can occur for any
very large bank irrespective of its
observed cross-border activity:
thus American bank failures still
hit European economies. This
could encompass between 30 and
50 financial groups, for which the
Treuhand would conduct
comprehensive balance-sheet
assessments as the basis for the
triage process, with the support of
national authorities. It would
publish the results in a consistent
manner, without privileging or
protecting particular banks or
national interests. The US stress-
test experience has proved that
such publication need not have
disruptive market effects. 
Second, it would catalyse the
recapitalisation, or other restruc-
turing, of the weaker
banks. The announce-
ment of triage results
would trigger market
pressure on weaker
banks, unlike the
current situation
where opaqueness
hampers market disci-
pline. By giving an accurate sense
of which banks need what amount
of fresh capital on a consistent
basis, the Treuhand would induce
the changes needed in national
government behaviour: in keeping
with the best traditions of
European-level inducements to
better economic policy by member
states, national governments
would have to accept trans-
parency about the state of their
banking systems in the best
interest of their countries. During
that period, the weaker banks
would continue to benefit from the
same guarantees, generally from
the home country, as they
currently rely on. 
Based on its system-
wide insight, the
Treuhand would broker
negotiations among
individual states to
share the burden of
recapitalisation in
cases where outside
investors would not
provide the required
funds. The combina-
tion of market pressure and
governments’ existing commit-
ment not to allow a disorderly
bankruptcy should result in even-
tual restructuring agreements.
These may involve the home
country but also host govern-
ments, irrespective of whether
they are Treuhand founders or
even outside the EU. The Treuhand
will greatly enhance the
chances of such agree-
ments by being a
trusted third party, by
providing centralisation
of information, and by
being able to provide a
commonly accepted
reference for the price
of any assets to be transferred
into government ownership and
the economic value of banking
franchises and operations.
Financial expenses associated
with each restructuring would be
negotiated among countries, thus
avoiding politically unpalatable
fiscal federalism.
This addresses the coordination
failures that have long been identi-
fied as obstacles to efficient cross-
border bank resolution
19. The
respective banks’ home countries
will have little choice but to make
agreements work, especially when
the announcements by the
Treuhand identify the banks at
risk, and when the shares of those
banks are primarily
held in the home
country, if not by the
home government. If
done in a coordinated
fashion across the
major European
banks, this will not
simply be a matter of
one-off operations, but
various countries
giving and taking
across the range of banks in ques-
tion. The initial efforts to rescue
Fortis and Dexia show that case-
by-case burden-sharing agree-
ments can be found under pres-
sure. The restructuring may also
include a haircut on claims held by
‘old’ creditors (before the state
guarantees extended in 2008-09),
which would save government
money. 
Third, the Treuhand would become
the trustee that holds bank equity
and other assets purchased by
national governments in the
restructurings on account for
them. This trusteeship would save
on costs, and has a strong prece-
dent in the US RTC when dealing
with state and local-level
institutions. It would provide a
barrier to national politicians
micro-managing bank lending
decisions or strategies, while
retaining clear accountability to
public owners. It would ensure
sound governance of any banks
‘The Treuhand
would be a barrier
to national politi-
cians micro-
managing bank
lending decisions or
strategies.’
‘In the current
situation, opaque-
ness hampers
market discipline.’
19Xavier Freixas, ‘Crisis
management in
Europe’, in Kremers,
Schoenmaker & Wierts
(eds.) Financial
Supervision in Europe,
Edward Elgar, 2003.b
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A SOLUTION FOR EUROPE’S BANKING PROBLEM
brought under public ownership.
Moreover, it would prevent the
destructive games otherwise
likely to emerge when it is time to
sell off the publicly held assets,
when national governments would
have an incentive to time their
sales so as to grab demand before
other governments
went to market, even
if the sales might be
premature, thus
driving down returns
to taxpayers and
possibly prompting
market instability.
Conversely, the
Treuhand could
sequence and synchronise sales
of assets, thus deepening markets
and improving price discovery,
possibly through contracts with
private asset managers.
In legal terms, the participating
countries would sign a binding
Founding Agreement
20 which
would govern the temporary estab-
lishment of the Treuhand, includ-
ing its legal form and place of
incorporation. Other member
states could join at a later stage.
The Treuhand would be governed
by a compact board, accountable
to participating governments and
parliaments, and liaising with EU
institutions and Council forma-
tions such as Ecofin and the
Eurogroup. It would be subject to
high standards of transparency.
The board would appoint a chief
executive, with significant power
over the recruitment, compensa-
tion and management of staff in
order to meet the challenge of
building a large, highly skilled
organisation in a very short period
of time. Operating expenses, trivial
compared to the public costs that
may arise in recapitalisations,
would be covered by
an  ex-ante commit-
ment of participating
countries during the
Treuhand’s expected
lifetime, with alloca-
tion among countries
through a no-
nonsense formula
such as the ECB’s
capital key. The Founding
Agreement would also commit
participating countries quickly to
pass enabling national legislation
to give the Treuhand direct author-
ity over relevant financial firms to
execute the tasks outlined above.
Supposing swift decision-making,
it is not impossible to imagine the
Treuhand being in place before the
end of 2009
21. 
4. TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE EU
FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK
This proposal is of a short-term
nature, and does not by itself
provide a sustainable policy
framework for an integrated EU
financial system. The De Larosière
Report provides a basis for this
debate, but more is needed.
Otherwise, financial fragmentation
may be irresistible, with negative
economic consequences for all
stakeholders. 
In a recent speech, the head of
Japan’s Financial Services Agency
remarked that ‘[a] relevant
suggestion from Japan’s experi-
ence [of the 1990s] is the need to
implement short-term measures
and medium-term re-design of the
regulatory framework in a simulta-
neous and balanced manner. [...]
On the one hand, if the policies
lean too much toward crisis
management, it could cause moral
hazard or distort the system in the
longer run. On the other hand,
hasty implementation of medium-
term measures could rather exac-
erbate the situation and make
crisis management even more
difficult’
22.  
This wise advice merits heeding. A
new EU supervisory architecture is
needed. But Europe’s banking
fragility also calls for measures to
be implemented in the next 12
months, such as this Policy Brief’s
Treuhand proposal. The banking
crisis is an acid test for the
European Union. It is not yet too
late to pass it successfully. 
The authors are grateful to all who
reviewed prior drafts of this policy
brief, and thank Marc
Hinterschweiger and Martín
Saldías Zambrana for excellent
research assistance.
20Most likely an
international treaty –
but this of course would
be much easier to
achieve than an EU
treaty, because of fewer
participants and no
unanimity requirement.
21As an example, the
more complex UK
Banking Act 2009 was
adopted in only six
months. 
22Takafumi Sato,
‘Putting the current
financial crisis in
perspective’, speech to
the Asia Financial
Forum in Okinawa, 30
January 2009. 
‘Hasty implementa-
tion of medium-
term measures
could make crisis
management even
more difficult.’
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